Four reports that rest on three original sources are not four pieces of evidence, but they are not one either. This paper asks what one set of decision records takes such a count to mean and what it recommends doing about it. It reads ten authored cases from AEGIS, a studio of the RISCON family: every case of AEGIS's calculation programme whose run counts how many distinct original sources a list of reports rests on. All ten are synthetic training cases written in Korean, not real events; every report, office and figure in them is the author's assumption, and the English quoted is this study's own translation.
Three findings follow. The same small count is read in two ways, as waste to be cleared and as a doubt about independence, and no case reads a repeated report as a safeguard in its own right. Every case recommends sorting the reports by their roots, and each rules out one of two opposite errors: binding different sources into one report, or letting copies of one source pass as many. And what makes two reports share a source is set by the author in the input, while nine of the cases list that judgment among what is still needed or unknown. Read beside the debates on redundancy and on agreement as evidence, the set treats independence as a label to be counted, where those literatures treat it as a matter of degree.