Lombard Street is not a case here. It enters because it put, in 1873, the question that this article asks of 1998 and 2008: whether the lender's duty, and its limits, are written down where the public can read them. The point of reading Bagehot's own words, rather than the summary of his rule that later debates use, is that the words show the rule and the demand for its publication arriving together.
The excerpts begin with the reserve. Bagehot observes that the Banking Department of the Bank of England held the cash reserve not only of the Bank but of the whole system, since every other bank kept its reserve there: "You always come back to the Bank of England at last." From this follows the apparent paradox that the final treasury must also be the final lender: "It is not unreasonable that our ultimate treasure in particular cases should be lent; on the contrary, we keep that treasure for the very reason that in particular cases it should be lent." The phrase that the parent study allows to be quoted without restriction gives the conclusion: "we must keep a great store of ready money always available, and advance out of it very freely in periods of panic, and in times of incipient alarm."
The high rate comes next, and with it a qualification that is often dropped. The rate is first a remedy for a foreign drain of gold: "Very large loans at very high rates are the best remedy for the worst malady of the money market when a foreign drain is added to a domestic drain." In chapter VII the rate becomes a rule of its own, "a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity", meant to keep away "persons who do not require it". And the collateral rule is stated as a rule about what the market will hear: "the way to cause alarm is to refuse some one who has good security to offer." Bagehot does not frame the refusal of a bad borrower as a danger; the excerpt says that refusing "bad bills or bad securities will not make the panic really worse". The good collateral is defined by ordinary practice, as "what in ordinary times is reckoned a good security--on what is then commonly pledged and easily convertible".
The passage that matters most for this article is about wording. Bagehot had in front of him a director's statement of the Bank's policy, and found it insufficient: "His words are too vague. No one can tell what a 'fair share' means; still less can we tell what other people at some future time will say it means." The objection is not that the Bank lent too little but that nobody could know in advance what it would do. The paragraph ends: "The public have a right to know whether the Bank of England--the holders of our ultimate bank reserve--acknowledge this duty, and are ready to perform it. But this is now very uncertain." Earlier, in chapter II, the same thought takes the form of a choice: "Either shut the Bank at once, and say it will not lend more than it commonly lends, or lend freely, boldly, and so that the public may feel you mean to go on lending." Lending in the middle way, "hesitatingly, reluctantly, and with misgiving", is in Bagehot's words "the worst of all policies".
Three things in these passages carry forward. The first is that Bagehot's lender lends to the market, to "all that bring good securities", and not to a named firm; the question of saving a particular institution does not arise in the excerpts. The second is that the test of eligibility is the security offered, judged by what is ordinarily pledged. The third is the demand that the policy be stated publicly and in words that a reader could hold the lender to. In the placement this article gives them, Humphrey's presentation of the doctrine as lending to solvent institutions rather than rescuing insolvent firms (Humphrey 1989) sits on the first two strands, and Tucker's call for rules set in advance (Tucker 2018) on the third. The two cases that follow ask what the American authorities wrote, more than a century later, on each of the three.