Chapter 2. Appendix: The records read

What is the wiring room's norm of a 'fair amount' called today?

The person who did too much, the person who did too little and the person who told on others to those above each had a name, and colleagues sanctioned them. In the United States in 2022, the attitude of doing only the work one is told to do was called by the name 'quiet quitting'. The working staff in the original record used the word kaltoe most of all.

The gist of Roethlisberger & Dickson 1939: the fourteen in the wiring observation room set a 'fair day's amount' for themselves, and colleagues sanctioned the person who did too much (rate-buster), the person who did too little (chiseler) and the person who told on others to those above (squealer).

Kaltoe is a word that draws a line not on amount but on time. Both studies are from a country and an era other than this organisation's.

Holding kaltoe up to the norm of a fair amount goes too far. Leaving on time is keeping the hours contracted, not evidence of a group norm that sanctions colleagues.

Leans to C. The wiring room's norm had a device by which colleagues sanctioned the one who broke it.

Even so, A's reading, that the habit of drawing 'this far' in their own words has continued from 1931 to today, is not thrown away. (as of 2026-09-25)

If a classification by context shows that in the original record kaltoe was often used as a word aimed at others, for instance said of a colleague who stays late, then there was a sanctioning norm and this judgment is wrong. It suffices to count the messages containing kaltoe, with people's names removed, divided into 'about oneself' and 'about others'.

Let the shop floor not have to draw the line of a fair amount in secret. When the amount and the hours of work are set from above, first ask, in a place where it shows, about the line the shop floor used to draw.

Has the norm that stopped people telling those above vanished?

It is the wiring observation room of a US telephone factory in 1931–32. Fourteen people set a fair day's amount for themselves. Colleagues sanctioned the person who did too much, the person who did too little and the person who told on others to those above. In 2000 Morrison and Milliken wrote that silence, in which people know of a problem but do not tell those above, spreads through the whole organisation.

Colleagues sanctioned the person who did too much, the person who did too little and the person who told on others to those above. Morrison and Milliken (2000): silence, in which people know of a problem but do not tell those above, spreads through the whole organisation and blocks change. The former is an observation of one workroom and the latter is a theory. Neither side measured what carried over between the two studies.

What changed is the channel.

What is said upward in a one-to-one window is not seen by colleagues' eyes. Where sanctions do not reach, 'telling on' and 'speaking up' mix.

The shape of not telling those above has not changed much since 1931. What changed is that one-to-one windows unseen by colleagues' eyes came into being. Whether the talk that went through those windows was telling on or voice cannot be told apart by these numbers. (as of 2026-09-25)

Read, in an anonymised sample, the talk mixed with pushback among the one-to-ones that went to the chief executive. If most of it aimed not at a particular colleague but at the work and the rules, the reading that 'telling on' was mixed in is thrown away. Whether sanctions among colleagues remained in the era of the one-to-one must be asked separately in an anonymous survey.

Do not record who said what to those above. When dealing with a problem that has come up, keep a way to take off the name of the one who spoke and deal with the problem alone, and so lower the price the one who spoke pays among colleagues.

Are systematic soldiering and quiet quitting the same gesture?

In 1911 Taylor, with a manager's eye, wrote down 'systematic soldiering', working slowly on purpose, and proposed doing away with it by time study.

Taylor 1911: proposed doing away, by time study, with systematic soldiering as seen with a manager's eye, that is, working slowly on purpose.

The former is a name given to something to be done away with, and the latter a name counted by a survey.

The same gesture moved from the exception to the majority.

The two records counted a similar gesture with a manager's eye and a survey's eye. What a century ago was an exception to be done away with is now counted as an ordinary state of more than half. It reads that the holding-back body has not vanished and that the place from which it is seen has changed. How much quiet quitting cuts performance is not said from this survey alone. (as of 2026-09-25)

If data comparing the actual output of those who do only the work they are told and those who do more show a large difference, the judgment is moved toward C.

Do not pick out those who do only the work they are told to do. Show to whom the work outside what is told falls for free, and give that share a name and a price.

Is 'quiet quitting' a way of holding out newly born in 2022?

In 1970 Hirschman said that when an organisation declines, people leave, speak or stay.

In half a century one new name came into being. Whether what came into being is a way of holding out or a name is this card's question.

Hirschman 1970: when an organisation declines, people leave (leaving), speak (speaking) or stay (staying).

'Quiet quitting', unlike its name, is not leaving. It is the side that stays and narrows the breadth of the work.

'Only what one is told' is working as much as was promised. Putting the name 'quitting' on it is the eye of the side that hopes to receive more. What newly came into being is not a way of holding out but the name that calls a way of holding out.

It holds that what newly came into being is closer to a name than to a way of holding out.

The name 'quiet quitting' came from the side that calls doing only as much as told a flaw. That does not mean this holding out has no cost. (as of 2026-09-25)

Automatic judgment does not pick out those who do only the work they are told to do. Show how differently the scope of 'the work one is told' swelled from person to person, so that the expectation of giving more does not tilt onto only a few people.

Did 1983's 'neglect' change its name to 'learning' in 1999?

In 1983 Farrell added 'neglect' to leaving, speaking and staying as responses to job dissatisfaction. Among the signs of neglect, along with lateness and absence, were increased mistakes. In 1999 Edmondson showed that in teams in a manufacturing company psychological safety leads to learning behaviour, and learning behaviour to team performance. One frame counted mistakes as a symptom of a mind about to leave, and the other saw that a team in which people can speak up learns.

Outside: Farrell (1983) added neglect to Hirschman's leaving, speaking and staying, and named lateness, absence and increased mistakes as signs of neglect. Edmondson (1999) showed psychological safety → learning behaviour → team performance in teams in a manufacturing company.

Where it diverges: what Farrell saw is the behaviour of making mistakes, and what the original record counted is the behaviour of speaking of mistakes. The renaming between the two frames is in fact closer to a change in what is counted.

The object changed. 1983 looked at the body that makes mistakes, and 1999 at the team that speaks up. The original record counted talk, so it can be read only with the frame of 1999.

What changed between 1983 and 1999 is less the leniency toward mistakes than what is counted. Neglect looked at the body that makes mistakes, and psychological safety at the team that speaks up. The original record counted talk, so it holds that reading its numbers as a symptom of neglect is choosing the wrong object. (as of 2026-09-25)

Find, year by year, records that counted mistakes themselves, such as the original organisation's correction notices or reasons for returns, and set them beside the talk admitting mistakes. If in 2023–2025, while people were falling away, mistakes and the talk of them rose together, the reading that the two frames are right at once is correct, and this judgment split the two too cleanly. It is to be looked for in the original organisation's work records.

In a period when mistakes increased, first look at how schedules and staffing tilted. Reading it as a symptom of a mind about to leave comes after that.

What set hard when the small talk of the corridor vanished?

Researchers examined the collaboration network after the move to remote work. Meetings and messages went on, but the places where people from different departments ran into one another by chance were gone.

Yang and colleagues (2021): after the move to remote work the collaboration network set hard and split into silos. Weak ties linking departments decreased.

The two surveys are from the same period, but they are not studies that tie each other as cause. It cannot be written that quiet quitting grew because small talk vanished.

Small talk did not vanish but moved to the messenger. But small talk on the messenger passes between people who already know each other. What remote work lost is not small talk but the chance meeting that crosses groups.

Small talk survived in remote work, but it was shut inside the groups people knew.

What Yang showed too was a decrease in ties that cross groups. What the era changed is less the amount of small talk than the reach of small talk. (as of 2026-09-25)

It is wrong if collaboration data come out showing that, after remote work too, messenger small talk crossing departments came back to the face-to-face level before the move. It is to be looked for in follow-up studies of company-wide collaboration networks after remote work.

In schedules split into silos by department, rotate the chances to take on the same work or to rest together with people from other departments so that they do not always go only to the same few people.

Where did the backstage, where feelings held down before customers come loose, move to?

Hochschild depicted the emotional labour of airline cabin crew in 1983. Feelings held down before customers come loose backstage. In 2009 Stephens and colleagues showed in an experiment that people who swear endure the pain of cold water longer. They are two pieces saying that the place of release changes with each era, but the body that must release stays the same.

Hochschild 1983 (airline cabin crew): emotional labour. Feelings held down before customers come loose backstage. Stephens, Atkins & Kingston 2009 (experiment): people who swore endured the pain of cold water longer. In the original record (2016–2026) the backstage was the chat rooms without the chief executive.

Neither study measured, era by era, where swearing comes out.

The messenger's backstage differs from the old backstage in that it stays in writing. As sounds that used to scatter became a record, feelings let loose became something that could later be read by someone.

Words said backstage in 1983 mostly scattered, no doubt, but ten years of the in-house messenger's backstage remained and became the original record of this card. That the body endures by swearing (C) can be said only as far as the experiment showed. What the era surely changed is that words let loose became words read later. (as of 2026-09-25)

If, even after people came to know that conversations are kept and can be read, the density of swearing in places without the chief executive did not fall, then the difference of being recorded had no effect on talk, and A is right. If there is a point at which the way of keeping changed, it is checked by comparing the values of places without the chief executive before and after it.

Even if the records of the backstage can be read, choose not to read them. So that words let loose do not later become evidence aimed at a person, leave the backstage as backstage.

On a messenger that reaches you at any time, is weekend small talk rest or standing by?

It is a study that looked at US professionals after they came to carry mobile email devices. People felt that, being able to answer at any time, they chose their own time. But as that autonomy built up, it became a duty to answer always.

The gist of the study is that the autonomy of being able to answer at any time became the duty of having to answer always. The original record begins in 2016, when collaboration tools had already settled in, and does not hold the days off from before the always-reachable tool came. So with this record it cannot be compared whether small talk on days off rose or fell after the tool came. The study looked at email and the original at a conversational messenger, so the expectation of how fast an answer is awaited may differ too.

The two mix within one person. When answers one chose oneself build up into everyone's expectation, the line that would divide the talk of rest from the talk of standing by blurs.

The original record holds only the time after the always-reachable tool came, so it cannot directly show the change of era in this question. What the study tells is that once the tool comes, one piece of talk on a day off carries rest and standing by together. To divide the two one must see whose call that talk answered. (as of 2026-09-25)

If the first message of conversations on days off was mostly not a request for work but small talk someone started, A weakens. It is checked by counting the first messages of day-off conversations in the original record, divided into requests and small talk.

Move requests for work that come in on a day off to a scheduled slot that arrives on the morning of the next working day. The autonomy to choose whether to answer stays on the receiver's side.

Why did break time fall when they were made to work from home?

A Chinese travel agency ran an experiment in having its agents work from home. The performance of agents who worked from home rose, and the share that came from less break time and sick leave was large. Promotion fell.

The gist of the study is that the performance of home-working agents rose, that a large share of it came from less break time and sick leave, and that promotion fell. The original did not measure break time; it counted talk.

This study is set down only as a counterexample to the assumption that 'when the supervisor's eye is far, the holding-back body grows'.

That promotion fell is the price. The share of resting less and doing more was in a place unseen, and recognition went to those seen at the office.

This experiment is a counterexample to the worry that rest grows when the supervisor's eye is far. At the same time, the result that promotion fell points to the share of resting less and doing more not leading to recognition. What changed as the era changed may be less the amount of the holding-back body than where the share of work done shows. (as of 2026-09-25)

If the reason the home-working agents' promotion fell was that they themselves wanted promotion less, the judgment that recognition passed them by is wrong. It is checked by dividing that experiment's promotion data into the number who applied and the number chosen.

The share of resting less was at home, and promotion went to the office. Put the processing records of the work-from-home period in the same column as office work in promotion review.

Why did a new work rule take root in the hospital that had places out of superiors' sight?

A 2009 study compared how surgical residents in two US hospitals took up a new work-hours rule. The reform settled in the hospital that had 'relational spaces', where residents, out of superiors' sight, talked over the new way. The rule came down from above, but its roots went down in the places out of sight.

The gist of the study is that the work reform settled in the hospital that had relational spaces out of superiors' sight.

It means that a place where their own talk lived stood apart throughout the record. The original did not count whether new rules took root in that place. The study's reform is a single rule that came down from outside, but no such single reform is written in the original.

Rooms out of superiors' sight are practice grounds where new rules are first worked through. That rooms thick with initialisms existed throughout the ten years means there was a place to lean on when the organisation changed.

The study showed that places out of sight can be a footing for change. In the original too such places were large throughout the ten years. It leans to A, which sees those rooms as practice grounds for new rules. But from the original's values alone it cannot be known what those rooms actually propped up, so C's boundary is left as it is. (as of 2026-09-25)

If, after the month a new rule came in, the name of that rule appeared late and rarely in chat rooms the chief executive did not take part in, A is wrong. Fix the month each rule was brought in, and compare the day the name first appeared and the number of times in the two kinds of room.

Share time and place for working through new rules with the rooms out of superiors' sight too, and keep open one channel by which questions raised there reach those above.

Where was the shut mouth learned, if it stays shut when superiors change?

It is a research synthesis that came out in 2009. It set out that fear at work makes people shut their mouths. It held that this fear comes from the present hierarchy, but also from the experience each person has been through.

The gist is twofold. Fear presses down speaking up, and that fear comes from hierarchy and from past experience. Being a research synthesis, it is not one workplace's numbers. The distance from the original record is great. The record counts only what was said, so a shut mouth leaves no trace, and nep is not not-speaking but speaking briefly.

The record has no career before joining.

Nep is not silence — the size of fear cannot be measured with nep, and a truly shut mouth leaves not one line in the record.

The gist that a shut mouth has a history lightens the habit of reading those above only as one person's present attitude. But what the record counts is nep, and nep is a short speaking up. Reading the first half-year's nep as fear from a previous job is only one possible reading; this record cannot see silence itself. (as of 2026-09-25)

If the first half-year nep of those for whom this is their first job and of those who came with a career is the same, the reading of past experience weakens. It is checked by setting career before joining against nep by time served, person by person, but this record has no career before joining, so personnel data are needed separately.

Caution learned in a previous place lasts longer than one word from a new superior. If a one-to-one that the superior asks for first is put in the schedule in the third month after joining, the first step in opening the mouth is taken not by the newcomer but by those above.

When the hope that speaking will change things fades, does pushback become talk of quitting?

A 1989 study examined what decides whether people leave, speak, stay or let go when a workplace declines. The cost of leaving, the hope that speaking will change things and the organisation's attractiveness went in as those conditions.

The gist of the study: it examined the cost of leaving, the hope that speaking will change things and the organisation's attractiveness as conditions dividing leaving, speaking, staying and neglect. The study is a questionnaire and did not count amounts of talk.

The original does not have how people saw the hope that speaking would change things.

Once those who would leave have left, the talk of leaving lessens too.

The three conditions, the cost of leaving, the hope that speaking will change things and the organisation's attractiveness, are fit to use as a frame for reading the original's 2023. The shape of pushback falling and talk of quitting rising also fits the picture of moving from speaking to leaving.

(as of 2026-09-25)

It suffices to see whether those who lessened pushback in 2023 and those who increased talk of quitting were the same people. If within one person arguing talk turned into talk of leaving, this study's conditions stand in the original too, and if they were different people, the two numbers are traces of a change in the make-up of those speaking. It is checked in the original's tallies by person and by year.

Pair each pushback raised with the change in schedule or assignment that followed, one line each, and post them on a board everyone sees.

When rough talk becomes common, does its force wear out too?

A 2011 experiment looked at whether the effect by which swearing helps people endure pain differs from person to person. The more often a person usually swore, the smaller the effect.

It asks whether, in the years it became common, that talk lost its force of holding out and wore down into a manner of speech that only adds strength.

The gist of the experiment is that one person's usual habit reduced the effect of swearing. The experiment measured one person's habit; it did not measure an organisation or an era.

The experiment measured one person's habit. That swearing across the organisation thickened cannot be said to mean that one person's habit thickened, and all the more since these are years in which those who spoke fell.

Wearing out is left as a question to be counted again person by person. (as of 2026-09-25)

If, counting separately only those who remained throughout the record, swearing still thickened year by year, B weakens, and the question 'does it wear out when it becomes common' can be asked within one person. In the original record, pick only those who spoke continuously from 2016 to 2021 and count the swearing rate again year by year.

If the force of swearing wore out, divide anew, to fit the number of people, the load that used to be held up by that force.

Does what is learned from failure remain after people leave?

A 2010 study looked at the launch organisations of the world space launch vehicle industry. The organisations learned more from failure than from success, and what they learned from failure lasted longer. The learning gained from success did not last as long.

Outside: the gist is that organisations learned more, and longer, from failure than from success. Whether learning attaches to people or to the organisation is a question this card adds, not the study's conclusion.

The original shows only as far as that the speech habit of admitting remained, not what was learned. Outcome numbers such as launch success rates are not in the original either.

What remains is less what was learned than the habit of speaking first. If 'I forgot' carried on in every room even as people changed, that habit lays down in advance a place for learning from the next failure.

That learning from failure lasts long is as far as the study says, and where it is held so as to last, the study does not say. The original's flat rate of admitting shows only as far as that a speech habit withstood the turnover of people. It does not read the speech habit remaining as learning remaining, but leans to the side that a place for the next learning remained. (as of 2026-09-25)

If admissions of mistakes in the same work and the same words as the mistakes of 2017 thicken again in 2024–2025 in the same chat rooms, the learning went out with the people who left. It is checked by recounting the mistake-admitting words by chat room each year and seeing whether the same words come back.

If the looking-back after a failure is gathered under the name of the work instead of people's names, learning that was carried only in the memory of those leaving moves to a place the next person opens.

How do gaps in the system show in a mistake written down as a person's fault?

Even for the same error, if only who did wrong is written down, the conditions of repetition drop out. The view that looks at the many gaps of the system together is better suited to reducing accidents, the research explains. This does not mean erasing the responsibility of the person who spoke of the mistake.

Outside: Reason (2000) contrasted the person model of error with the model that looks at the holes in the system. From the fact alone that talk admitting mistakes was steady in the original, it cannot be known whether the system learned.

Individual choice and system conditions must be recorded together.

Take the words of the person who made the mistake as the starting point, but do not close the conclusion on that person. The reading that sets the path of repetition and the conditions at the time side by side keeps alive the limits of both this research and the original. (as of 2026-09-25)

If the error disappears when the same conditions are not reproduced and only individual choices differ, the influence of individual choice is the greater.

Show side by side the schedule, the information and the share of checking at the place where the error happened. Do not let the person who admitted the mistake bear the responsibility for the next check alone.